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With the publication of Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri an-
nounced a new form of sovereignty, Empire, which implied moving from na-
tion-state sovereignty to global sovereignty. This paper revises some of the 
main aspects of the theory to understand Imperial sovereignty as well as its 
post-territorial political community of resistance, multitude. In this critical 
reading of some of Hardt and Negri’s concepts, sovereignty is conceived as 
two-sided: a conflictual relationship between the one who rules and those 
who are ruled. This conflictual approach implies the revitalization of popular 
sovereignty (as opposed to the constituted order) and of territory, albeit not 
limited to the nation-state. As a result, an alternative framework is offered to 
explain the existing forms of sovereignties consisting of three elements: mul-
ti-scalar sovereignty, interdependence and intersectional political communi-
ty. This approach, rather than taking the point of view of the states, explores 
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1. Introduction 
When revisiting their book Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2019: p. 
67) refuse that globalization is either dead or even in decline but rather “less eas-
ily legible”. Since the processes of globalization are less legible, they claim for 
more attention to how global governance has been constituted in the last twenty 
years through the powers of nation-states and the global structures of capitalist 
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production and reproduction. Their statement is in contradiction with all the 
analysts who mourn the decline of the liberal order and the reactionary forces 
that defend the return of national sovereignty, including the left wing which sees 
national sovereignty as the space to resist the attacks of neoliberalism, multina-
tional corporations and global elites. Despite the defeatism of the liberalists (the 
end of the liberal international order) and the reaction of the nationalists (the 
return of national sovereignty from the right and the left), Hardt and Negri 
maintain a similar position to the one formulated twenty years ago: Globaliza-
tion is an irreversible process and any attempt to oppose it (by claiming the re-
turn to modern sovereignty) would be wrong, regardless of reactionary or 
emancipatory intentions. 
The conceptualization of globalization in its form of Empire already provoked 
a lot of criticism. Slavoj Žižek saluted the book as the “Communist Manifesto for 
the twenty-first century” for proving that, following Marx, capitalism digs its 
own grave. The deterritorialization, caused by globalization, makes it more dif-
ficult for capitalism to control all the centrifugal forces so the supposed global 
triumph of capitalism unveils, in reality, its vulnerability. The assumption of glo-
balization as the only reality of both dominance and resistance was highly con-
tested. Žižek (2001: p. 193) calls Empire pre-Marxist due to the trust in how the 
socio-economic process will create the space for radical measures or, in other 
words, that revolution will emerge out of “the inherent antagonisms of the capi-
talist mode of production”. In this regard, the revolution claimed by the Left 
does not need to be planned or hoped for, given that it would have already taken 
place (Brennan, 2003). Besides the immanent reading of Marx to account for 
Empire as form of domination and counter-Empire as one of resistance, the cri-
tiques aimed at the replacement of imperialism with Empire, the total rejection 
of the role of states and sovereignty, and the limitations of multitude as political 
subject. Hardt and Negri’s position has been labeled postmodern globalist ide-
ology of post-Marxism (Browning, 2005), left-liberalism (Cremin & Roberts, 
2011), neoliberal globalization-sympathizing (Fotopoulos & Gezerlis, 2002) or, 
in sharper tone, “infantile vanguardism” (Thompson, 2005). Samir Amin syn-
thetizes some of the concerns that Empire raised within the Left by claiming 
that the underlying position sustained by Hardt and Negri is that there is no 
alternative to the current phase of capitalism: “This is the discourse of our 
moment of defeat, a moment that has not yet been surpassed.” The only option 
then is to move away from such a discourse: “The renaissance of a left worthy of 
the name, capable of inspiring and implementing progress for the benefit of 
the people, requires a radical rupture with discourses of this type” (Amin, 2005: 
p. 12). 
When moving away from state-centric visions within an International Rela-
tions perspective, there are two aspects I consider of vital importance: domina-
tion and resistance. As pointed out by David Chandler (2006), power and domi-
nation have traditionally been understood in two ways: formal empire, as denial 
of the right to self-government, and informal empire, as the information rela-
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tions in the socio-economic sphere of market relations. Although Empire was 
originally the domination of other territories, deprived of their right to sove-
reignty, approaches like Hardt and Negri’s “have focused on empire based on 
the power of capital rather than formal territorial control and the denial of sove-
reignty” (Chandler, 2006: p. 13). Despite their inclusion of factors of political 
and military power, it is true that the global expansion of capital is the main fac-
tor to explain the shift towards imperial sovereignty and the emergence of mul-
titude, particularly when Empire becomes a non-space. On the other hand, I 
would like to introduce the question raised by Richard K. Ashley about how to 
understand “community” in international political life. Ashley (1987: p. 406) re-
minds us that for realists what characterizes international politics is anarchy and 
not community. Communities are circumscribed within sovereign states and ex-
ist only at the level of national society. Thus, “there is no political community in 
the pluralistic world of power politics”. The proposal contained in Empire chal-
lenges the distinction between national (communities and sovereign states) and 
international (anarchy) through a principle of decentralized power (Empire, 
global capital) and an emerging transnational community (a multitude, political 
subjectivities). 
Hardt and Negri offer, in all, a new approach to globalization by opposing 
Empire and multitude and highlighting the decline of the state as an actor capa-
ble of controlling global processes. However, the focus on Empire as informal 
empire (the mechanisms of global capitalism) ignores the centrality still played 
by sovereignty in defining the political community and even how the loss of the 
control of sovereignty by the state implies that other actors promote alternative 
narratives of who that community is. In other words, the definition of both so-
vereignty and political community is at stake. Furthermore, the imprecise nature 
and composition of multitude makes the concept insufficient when talking about 
a political community. Therefore, I propose a rereading of some of the aspects of 
Empire (and more widely the work of Hardt and Negri) to move from the idea 
of global (or Imperial) sovereignty to multi-scalar sovereignty, where the global 
is one of the scales together with the national and the local, and from multitude 
to intersectional political community (as a way of overcoming a homogeneous 
identity or the exclusivity of the national sphere). 
In the following, I will focus on Hardt and Negri’s conceptualization of sove-
reignty (and the shift from modern to Imperial sovereignty) and multitude, as 
the new political community. Subsequently, I will revise those concepts in order 
to develop the meaning and implications of multi-scalar sovereignty and inter-
sectional political community as alternatives.   
2. Towards Global Sovereignty 
From the beginning of their book, Hardt and Negri (2000) warn about the cen-
trality of sovereignty to understand globalization (economic and cultural ex-
changes), since a new form of sovereignty has emerged: “Empire is the political 
subject that effectively regulates these global exchanges, the sovereign power that 
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governs the world”. The decline of nation-states does not imply the decline of 
sovereignty. Although one wonders if this new form of sovereignty is as irre-
versible as globalization or if relationships between novel governmentalities and 
claims to sovereignty are satisfactorily addressed, Hardt and Negri offer a frame-
work to overcome the validity of modern sovereignty (nation-state sovereignty) 
and modern political community (the nation, the people) to grasp the challenges 
derived from the global world. Therefore, I present Hardt and Negri’s arguments 
to reject the validity of modern sovereignty to account for global politics and to 
embrace consequently a new form of global constitution (Imperial sovereignty) 
and of global resistance (multitude).  
2.1. Modern Sovereignty 
Hardt and Negri’s (2000: p. 74) rejection of any form of sovereignty is rooted in 
their understanding of modern sovereignty. The authors of Empire conceive 
modernity not as unitary but unfolded in two modes: Modernity as a radical re-
volutionary process which “declares the immanence of the new paradigm of the 
world and life” and defines “a tendency toward a democratic politics, posing 
humanity and desire at the center of history”; and modernity as a form of tran-
scendent constituted power against immanent constituent power and of order 
against desire. The dichotomy of immanence and transcendence creates two on-
tological and incompatible ways of understanding politics. Shortly, immanence is 
“the idea that there are no transcendental principles or agents relevant to human 
life, and that whatever norms, institutions, or critiques we generate must be ex-
plicated and defended without reference to such transcendentals” (Moore, 2011: 
p. 3). Hardt and Negri pursue then to develop an immanence politics by reco-
vering modernity as radical revolutionary process and opposed to any form of 
transcendental constituted power. The revolutionary process is incarnated by 
multitude, capable of using its immanent powers to construct an alternative through 
autonomous and nonhierarchically organized self-management (Harvey, Hardt, 
& Negri, 2009). The transcendental power is, on the other hand, deployed by the 
modern state to dismantle the power of multitude. 
Modern sovereignty represents the second mode of modernity to prevent 
multitude from “organizing itself spontaneously and expressing its creativity 
autonomously” (Hardt & Negri, 2000: p. 83). Transcendence manifests itself 
through sovereignty and representation. In their explanation of how both con-
stitute forms of command and transcendence, Hardt and Negri underpin the in-
tertwined conceptualizations made by Hobbes on sovereignty and Rousseau on 
representation. Only moving from sovereignty and representation attached to 
this mode of sovereignty, immanence politics, as a process of liberation, would 
be possible.  
Hobbes’s idea of an absolute sovereign ruler helps to understand the forma-
tion of a transcendent political apparatus as form of mediation to eliminate the 
revolutionary potential of immanence. The plurality of wills is unified and 
represented in the will of the transcendent sovereign. Thus, the transcendence of 
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the sovereign is founded on the immanent logic of human relations, but the so-
vereign power, through the legitimization attributed by representation, separates 
it from the multitude of subjects. Rousseau would make a similar point when he 
admits that political representation is impossible since the will cannot be represented 
but, in order to preserve sovereignty, it is necessary to represent the “general 
will” as unified and unanimous political subject (Hardt & Negri, 2017). The rep-
resentative and unified character of the general will contrasts with the plurality 
of the “will of all” which is not representable and consequently opposed to any 
form of sovereignty. Hardt and Negri conclude that despite abandoning divine 
notions of authority which have been secularized, modern power is still theolog-
ical due to the transcendent position occupied by sovereign power above society 
and outside its structures (Hardt & Negri, 2009).  
The main political communities associated with modern sovereignty were the 
nation and the people. The nation became, indeed, the hypostasis of the general 
will and national sovereignty, and popular sovereignty the best way of improving 
modern sovereignty. Rather than being the result of sovereignty, the nation 
claims to precede it and to be prior to its historical development. The nation 
ends up becoming “the condition of possibility of all human action and social life 
itself” (Hardt & Negri, 2000: p. 101). When the notion of “the people” emerged, it 
reinforced sovereign power due to the losing capacity of the nation as sole legi-
timating force. The people naturalized sovereignty, too, and complemented the 
nation. However, “the people” would not be the primordial basis of the nation 
but a product of the nation-state. The implications of this claim are enormous: 
The shift to a form of global sovereignty questions the usefulness of sovereignty 
(and representation), characteristic of the modern state, and of the people as po-
litical community, as dependent on the form of the modern state.  
2.2. Imperial Sovereignty 
As mentioned above, Empire is the sovereign power that governs the world. Far 
from being the end of sovereignty, Empire entails a new form of sovereignty 
called Imperial sovereignty where Empire is the ultimate subject of sovereignty. 
The hypothesis is that “sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series 
of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule” 
(Hardt & Negri, 2000). Antonio Negri deepens this vision when affirming that 
nation-states no longer mean anything because there is only one way of thinking 
politics: globally. Contrary to the interpretations of International Relations in 
terms of competing nation-states, national politics would now happen only 
within the globalized world. The emergence of continental maps (the United 
States, Europe, Russia and China) reflects a structure defined by the friction be-
tween two tectonic plates: “on one side, the real globalization that actually hap-
pened, on the other side, the political plate that is fragmented into continental 
dimensions” (in Shibasaki, 2019: p. 11). Thus, Empire is not a homogeneous and 
univocal subject, and nation-states are not in direct conflict with Empire. Mi-
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chael Hardt (undated) emphasizes that it would be wrong to think that the in-
creasing power of globalization means decreasing power of nation-states or vice 
versa. Nation-states are continuously being reorganized in the form of Imperial 
sovereignty. 
Empire can easily be defined in contrast to imperialism which is a phenome-
non of modernity, characterized by the competition between states in the inter-
national arena, by means of extending the sovereignty of European nation-states 
beyond their own boundaries. The definition of boundaries was crucial: The ter-
ritorial boundaries of the nation delimited the center of power whose rule was 
exerted over external territories. Empire entails the end of a territorial center of 
power and fixed boundaries. Empire is “a decentered and deterritorializing ap-
paratus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its 
open, expanding frontiers”. Whereas modern sovereignty resides in limiting ter-
ritory and policing its boundaries, imperial sovereignty is expansive and its space 
is always open. In short, Empire is the single sovereign power. Probably, a great 
part of the critique against Empire (Boron, 2005; Amin, 2005, 2014) aimed at 
these two points: not acknowledging the predominance of some national powers 
in the international field (instead of thinking in terms of friction as suggested by 
Negri) and refusing the existence of a new form of imperialism (instead of ac-
cepting the decentralized and deterritorializing Empire). 
Nonetheless, there is no way back to nation-state sovereignty or to recover the 
modern critical strategy for Hardt and Negri, since the border place between in-
side and outside no longer exists. It is not possible to define sovereignty, as hap-
pened with modern sovereignty, through the relation of the territory and its out-
side. Imperial sovereignty works in a similar way to the world market which, 
undoing any type of divide between inside and outside, makes the entire globe 
its domain. Comparing with the places of modernity, constructed through the 
dialectical opposition between inside and outside, there is no place of power for 
Empire; it is everywhere and nowhere. 
Empire being the single sovereign power could lead to thinking that it is un-
contestable or, at least, difficult to contest. Hardt and Negri, on the contrary, 
celebrate the possibilities opened by Empire and consider wrong any opposition 
to Empire within the logics of modernity and modern state. The absence of out-
side strengthens the claim for immanence politics. The modern state, by dep-
loying transcendent authority, was an obstacle to developing the immanent and 
democratic forces. The situation changes with Empire: Imperial sovereignty is 
decentralized and not organized around one central conflict but micro-conflicts 
and its conflicts are then everywhere. Furthermore, capitalism is now dependent 
on the production of communication, emotions, language and affect, expressed 
by the immanent forces of desire and cooperation of the multitude (what Hardt 
and Negri call “the common”). Despite the uncertainty about when and how, 
multitude becomes the political subject to shape the counter-Empire that would 
offer a new global alternative and a new way of living in the world.  
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2.3. Multitude 
In modernity, the multitude and the people represented two modes of moderni-
ty: the revolutionary vs. the counter-revolutionary or the immanent vs. the tran-
scendent. From their origins, both concepts are defined by opposition. “The people” 
is unity, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed. It entails 
identity and homogeneity through generating the divide between the inside 
(what the people is) and the outside (what the people is not). On the other hand, 
multitude is “a multiplicity, a plane of singularities, an open set of relations, 
which is not homogeneous or identical with itself and bears an indistinct, inclu-
sive relation to those outside of it” (Hardt & Negri, 2000: p. 103). The people and 
multitude are in conflict: The former enhances a single will and action, and the 
latter entails a plurality of wills and actions. State sovereignty aims to neutralize 
the immanent and revolutionary forces of multitude through transcendent au-
thority and reducing the multiplicity of multitude into the unity of the people. 
Multitude is not reducible to sameness (as it happens with the people) since it is 
both multiplicity and collectivity at the same time (Ali, 2020). The challenge here 
is double: How to avoid that multiplicity becomes fragmentation and incohe-
rence, and how to avoid that collectivity is shaped by a common unified identi-
ty? Hardt and Negri do not rely on identity but on what the multiplicity of sub-
jects has in common. The new global organization in networks allows multitude 
to communicate, collaborate and share a common political project (Hardt & 
Negri, 2004). It should not be forgotten, as Negri recalls, that the concept of 
multitude was born as a class concept. In the global context, the exploitation of 
work has expanded to the exploitation of society, including other subjects such 
as women, students, sexual minorities, ethnic groups, etc. Multitude pursues to 
cover the multiplicity of singularities that the homogenizing force attributed to 
“the people” by Hardt and Negri excludes.  
The opposition between the people and multitude is not restricted to modern-
ity. The same differences can be identified when talking about populism nowa-
days. Hardt and Negri (2017) single out a similar starting point between the 
work of Ernesto Laclau and their own: There is no single subject that can unify 
the heterogeneity of the social field. This is the only common aspect. Both projects 
differ in their position on immanence or transcendence. According to Hardt and 
Negri, Laclau applies a transcendent operation through the hegemonic forma-
tion from above consisting in reducing the plurality of social subjectivities into 
“the people” in antagonism with an outside (the elite, what people is not). The 
problem, they conclude, is that Laclau is still relying on categories of modern 
politics and modern sovereignty, not adequate to grasp the new form of imperial 
sovereignty. Multitude, on the contrary, implies the self-organization from be-
low of the multiplicity of social subjectivities in struggle. There is no need for 
transcendent intervention (representation or sovereignty), and the main chal-
lenge is to organize existing struggles which already are exploiting and making 
visible the contradictions of global capitalism. If modern sovereignty provoked 
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the exclusion of the multitude in favor of the people, Imperial sovereignty, de-
centered and expansive, creates the condition to liberate the productive and 
immanent forces of multitude. Any attempt to reclaim “the people” as political 
community in times of Empire is doomed to fail. Despite the difficulty of im-
agining how the global network of the multitude, as plurality of singularities, can 
speak as such (Çubukçu, 2005: p. 6), social cooperation and collective intelli-
gence would develop a horizontal decision-making model.  
3. Critical Standpoints 
Having presented some of the most important points of Hardt and Negri’s 
framework, I would like to introduce some critical reflections regarding their 
conceptualization of sovereignty and of multitude as the new political Empire. 
Basically, I argue that ignoring other types of sovereignty and of political com-
munities is reducing the field of contestation and limiting the responses to and 
within global sovereignty, particularly when assuming the perspective of social 
and political struggles. The search for non-sovereign institutions, suggested by 
Hardt and Negri, as an option out of sovereignty, can be quite limited to articu-
late a political community of resistance. For this reason, I reincorporate the idea 
of popular sovereignty, despite its tension with the notion of the multitude, al-
though, as I understand it, popular sovereignty cannot be attached exclusively 
to nation-state. This territorial perspective is also applied to the notion of 
post-territorial political communities in order to regain the local and national 
framework within a global perspective.  
3.1. The Limitation of Non-Sovereignty 
As mentioned, sovereignty has not disappeared but moved from states to Empire. 
Thus, sovereignty in its new form is central, but this is only true regarding the 
side of domination. The recognition of Imperial sovereignty does not imply that 
the antagonist emergent political subject (multitude) aims to become the new 
sovereign. Multitude, indeed, pursues to become non-sovereign. This scenario 
contributes to uncertainty in several aspects: How can the new form of sovereignty 
(more complex than modern sovereignty) be contested only by non-sovereignty 
(exodus)? Why is it necessary to renounce to state sovereignty when global so-
vereignty remains uncontested (so far only in the form of non-sovereign institu-
tions)? And most importantly: Can sovereignty be reduced only to the field of 
domination? I consider it important to address these questions to deepen Hardt 
and Negri’s idea of sovereignty as contradictory relationship as well as to rethink 
the role of state sovereignty and of non-sovereignty as the solution offered to 
combat Imperial sovereignty. 
In Multitude, Hardt and Negri (2004: p. 332) warn that the realm of the polit-
ical cannot be reduced to state sovereignty, given that sovereignty is a more 
complex concept. Sovereignty is two-sided, consisting of “a relationship between 
rulers and ruled, between protection and obedience, between rights and obliga-
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tions”. There is no one side that is more important than the other or indispensa-
ble (either those who obey or the one who commands). Indeed, the ruled re-
volted and restored sovereignty when tyrants appropriated sovereignty and tried 
to convert it into something unilateral. The utility of violence and war is limited, 
and consent is also needed. In order to obtain obedience, the sovereign power 
must constantly negotiate the relation with the ruled. The duality of sovereignty 
does not only imply that sovereignty is negotiated: It is also a constant struggle. 
Thus, the two-sided relationship becomes both an obstacle for the sovereign 
power, feeling how its power is blocked or limited, and an opportunity to chal-
lenge and overthrow the sovereign power. 
I consider this conception of sovereignty as two-sided essential to redefining 
sovereignty in times of crisis of nation-states and increasing globalization (but 
also processes of localization). Sovereignty is not something posed by the sove-
reign power, and its relational nature implies, too, that it is conflictual. The ruled 
do not necessarily accept a certain type of sovereignty and protests and rebels 
against it. At the state level, sovereignty could be understood in terms of ten-
sions and conflicts between the ruler and the ruled, as well as at the global level, 
where the relations of domination and the actors (including the political com-
munity) would vary.  
However, Hardt and Negri do not explore this duality of sovereignty because 
their goal is how to avoid the sovereignty trap and not how to understand the 
relations between actors in the conflictual relationship between those who com-
mand and those who are ruled. Hardt and Negri conceive that the only option to 
fight against the asymmetric relation of sovereignty and the position of servitude 
aimed at the ruled is that the ruled subtract themselves from that relationship. 
This move is an act of liberation and a kind of exodus. Hardt and Negri want to 
emphasize that such an exodus would not entail withdrawing from the struggle 
against the sovereign and power or giving the whole power to the sovereign. 
Since sovereignty is a relationship, the act of refusal is a real threat that makes 
sovereignty crumble. The increasing dependence of Empire on multitude makes 
it impossible to exclude population, as happened under modern sovereignty, and 
an apparent paradox emerges: Empire creates a global society that is becoming 
more autonomous, since the Empire relies on society. In this regard, Hardt and 
Negri (2004: p. 336) appreciate the potential of liberation for multitude as coun-
ter-Empire as overcoming sovereignty: “We are thus no longer bound by the old 
blackmail: the choice is not between sovereignty or anarchy. The power of the 
multitude to create social relationships in common stands between sovereignty 
and anarchy, and it thus presents a new possibility for politics”. Consequently, in 
Assembly they present the creation of non-sovereign institutions as the only al-
ternative to the new form of global sovereignty. 
It is at least contradictory that Empire is a new form of global sovereignty, in 
the making or already existing, that can be resisted only from non-sovereign po-
sitions or exodus, or that sovereignty is two-sided unless the ruled (that is not an 
option for the ruler) subtract themselves from that relation. As mentioned pre-
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viously, it would be more interesting to conceive political and social struggles 
within the tensions and conflicts derived from the duality of sovereignty (in-
cluding those of autonomy). Hardt and Negri shift focus from the passage from 
state to imperial sovereignty to the one from sovereignty to non-sovereignty. 
Whereas the struggles for or within state sovereignty did not belong to the 
struggles of the multitude, the movements that do not aim to achieve autonomy 
are not considered as part of the multitude either. Sovereignty is reduced to the 
place of domination rather than struggle, and any possibility of framing political 
and social struggles as struggles for sovereignty is eliminated.  
3.2. The Reclaiming of Popular Sovereignty? 
Hardt and Negri’s reluctance towards modern sovereignty (and sovereignty in 
general) as field of battle remains clear in their lack of interest in exploring pop-
ular sovereignty as mode to articulate social demands (the ruled) in conflict with 
the sovereign power (the ruler). This antagonism would be consequent with the 
conflictual relationship of sovereignty as two-sided. However, Hardt and Negri 
refer only twice to popular sovereignty and in both cases as synonym of national 
sovereignty. This is not surprising when people are considered a unifying cate-
gory, reducing the multiplicity of singularities of the multitude, and any form of 
representation is rejected for similar reasons. However, by excluding popular 
sovereignty, the distinction between national and popular sovereignty becomes 
irrelevant, and the potential of popular sovereignty to challenge the established 
order (in a similar manner to what Hardt and Negri do when opposing consti-
tuent and constituted power) is ignored. My intention in this section is to intro-
duce popular sovereignty as complementary to the previous idea that sovereign-
ty as relationship is still relevant and implies the existence of conflict between 
two actors that pursue prevalence or change of the existing order.  
The tension between the “general will” (unified and object of sovereignty) and 
“will of all” (multiplicity and contrary to sovereignty) must be understood with-
in the larger distinction reflecting the two sides of sovereignty. The very idea of 
“popular sovereignty” is almost irreconcilable with the one of sovereignty: The 
latter refers to an indivisible authority, above the law, whilst the former is about 
the rule by the demos (Brown, 2010). Besides the duality of sovereignty, another 
phenomenon must be taken into account: the “detachment of sovereignty from 
the nation-state” (Brown, 2010: p. 24) when emerging and consolidating other 
global forces. There are two conceptions of sovereignty: as disputed concept (the 
dual side) and as declining sovereignty (the friction between nation-states and 
globalization). These conceptions do not correspond exactly with the divide be-
tween internal and external sovereignty, because, if sovereignty is becoming 
global, the duality can also be reflected at the global level. That said, nation-state 
is still predominant, but not exclusive, when political and social struggles claim 
for popular sovereignty.  
The question is whether sovereignty moving to other scales should follow by 
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giving up popular sovereignty. According to Hardt and Negri, that should be the 
case, for two reasons: Popular sovereignty is anchored in modern sovereignty 
(and there is no way back in relation to that), and “the people” entails the rejec-
tion of immanence and the multiplicity of subjectivities. However, the claim for 
popular sovereignty is not (or, at least, not only) an attempt to return to na-
tion-state sovereignty. Hardt and Negri make an interesting point by affirming 
that global capitalism (biocapitalism or cognitive capitalism) relies strongly on 
multitude (its creativity as source for the common), but, in their hopes for an 
organized multitude to come, they do not consider how neoliberalism, as current 
form of global capitalism, is undoing the demos and its consequences for our 
understanding of democracy. Wendy Brown (2015: p. 31), for instance, puts the 
emphasis on the ubiquitous economization of all features of life by neoliberal-
ism. Besides the marketization of all spheres, this means that “neoliberal ratio-
nality disseminates the model of the market to all domains and activities […] 
and configures human beings exhaustively as market actors, always, only, and 
everywhere as homo oeconomicus”. Human beings are then configured as homo 
oeconomicus, particularly as human capital across all spheres of life. Here the 
dependence of capital on the forces of multitude should counter such powerful 
subjectivization, but it is not quite clear how. Brown’s critique of Foucault for 
not paying attention to homo politicus could be applied to Hardt and Negri as 
well. Except for organizing multitude, there is a lack of attention to how to build 
a political alternative which does not emerge from Empire as economic system 
of production. In this attempt to resist the homo oeonomicus, Brown suggests to 
reclaim democracy. This is not possible without popular sovereignty: “Whatever 
popular sovereignty might mean in contemporary national and post-national 
politics the link between democracy and popular sovereignty is one we just can’t 
give up” (in Celikates & Jansen, 2012: p. 69). Despite its imprecise meaning, 
popular sovereignty becomes necessary to recover control by the people, equality 
and participation. Thus, sovereignty is not limited to the one who commands 
and not even to the representative system, but it is open to political and social 
forces.  
Neoliberal rationality re-signified democracy, equality and freedom as values 
oriented towards the market. Popular sovereignty becomes then an anomaly, 
since the marketization does not apply to spaces where the people rules itself. 
For this reason, the claim for popular sovereignty can become a turning point to 
recover the meanings of equality and freedom into a democratic project. Popular 
sovereignty is an openness by the demos in opposition to the closure of the so-
vereignty by the ruler. This conceptualization of popular sovereignty can avoid 
the risk of sovereignty becoming the “general will” (unified, attributed by a 
transcendent power) instead of the “will of all” (Baiocchi, 2018). Sovereignty can 
easily be used to cement a partial view of the world. Baiocchi proposes that so-
vereignty must not be a state but a process where both the “We” and sovereignty 
are open to reinvention. Since sovereignty is a relationship, rather than empha-
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sizing only one side (the “We” or the sovereign), the ruler (being sovereign) and 
the demos (“the people”) must work together: “the We placing a check on Sove-
reignty, while Sovereignty gives the We more meaning” (2018: 20). The impor-
tance of popular sovereignty to forge a democratic project should not be taken 
uncritically, and one should be cautious of the meaning that is attributed to it. 
Control by the people and the redefinition of the community can be strongly at-
tached to re-territorialization of power within the limits of the nation-states by 
opposing globalization (Kallis, 2018). In this case, it is necessary to pay attention 
to the meanings given to democracy by popular sovereignty and how it is posi-
tioned in the tension between state and global sovereignty (and the resulting po-
litical community). 
3.3. The Reterritorialization of Post-Territorial Political  
Community 
Previously, I questioned the rejection of sovereignty and the non-sovereign op-
tion as the only one and the omission of popular sovereignty (for being part of 
the already overcome modern sovereignty). Now I look at the limitation of mul-
titude as political community, called to replace territorialized political communi-
ties and to respond to Empire at the global level. After a short appreciation of multi-
tude, I assess some of the problems derived from its condition as post-territorial 
political community and the need to recover the territorial perspective.  
It is curious that “the people” as category can have progressive or reactionary 
meanings (like popular sovereignty) but multitude, as conceptualized by Hardt 
and Negri, is conceived only as a positive and democratic force. From a different 
perspective, Paolo Virno (2004: p. 17) characterizes multitude as an “amphi-
bious” category, as Sylvère Lotringer manifests in the foreword: it “can veer to-
ward ‘opposing developments’, or come to nothing, so a combat is constantly 
raging not with Empire, within itself”. It is also amphibious in another sense: It 
speaks of social production based on knowledge and language and of the crisis of 
the state (Virno, 2004). Multitude is presented as alternative to the form of state, 
but not as only positive. It is true that multitude can be solidary and cooperative 
(in Gago, 2006), but it is not exempt of aggressiveness or self-destructive drive. 
In any case, the contention of mitigation of multitude would not be solved, ra-
ther the opposite, by the state. Virno’s conception of multitude offers a different 
understanding of multitude as ambivalent that adds internal contradictions and 
risks to overcome. Nonetheless, both share the idea that multitude should de-
velop autonomous and stateless spaces. This point leads me to some considera-
tions about the post-territorial political community. 
David Chandler (2009a) addresses quite critically the possibilities of post ter-
ritorial political community. He singles out that state sovereignty has been chal-
lenged from above (the biopolitical processes of production manifested in the 
form of Empire) and from below (the resistance to neoliberal governance by 
multitude). Chandler, comparing liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructu-
ralists, underpins three problematic issues. First, instead of demonstrating the 
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existence or strength of alternative post-territorial community, the starting point 
is the rejection of state-based political community. Second, the political commu-
nity’s lack of conceptual grounding (the existence of the rights-bearing subject) 
as the connection between citizenship and political community is broken. Final-
ly, the mediating links of political community are so attenuated that it is difficult 
to see the connection between particular individuals or struggles and the collec-
tive political subject.  
It is clear that the initial conceptualization of multitude as counter-Empire 
generated expectations of an emerging global political subject, but it remains ra-
ther an abstract concept, or, when being concretized, it is mainly rooted in local 
spaces (conceived as spaces of autonomy or non-sovereignty that challenged 
global sovereignty). Therefore, the final pages of Empire are quite surprising be-
cause they present a global program to combat Empire. The incongruence con-
sists in formulating the program as rights: the right to global citizenship, the 
right to social wage or basic income and the right to reappropriation. Due to the 
absence of a global subject, it is strange to attribute it rights which require to be 
managed and applied at the national and local levels too. Chandler (2009a: p. 60) 
talks about political community without political subjects, given that “the prob-
lematic question of political representation and the formal constitution of polit-
ical community” is evaded. For this reason, I pointed out the contradiction de-
rived from considering multitude as existing community (attributing it rights 
such as global citizenship) when the main goal is to organize existing struggles 
emerging from the contradictions of biocapitalism.  
To solve the contradictions of post-territorial political community, Chandler 
highlights that political community takes a nation-state territorial form to or-
ganize itself for political representation, but this is not incompatible with 
post-territorial content at the ideological and political levels, as expressed by in-
ternational solidarity and support. I agree with the combination of intertwined 
state-territorial and post-territorial connections. However, the critique of the 
lack of existing political community at the global level comparable with the na-
tional one should not ignore the crisis of state sovereignty and how the territori-
al and post-territorial connections are becoming a necessity of political subjects 
to face global issues. The state is still the main arena to define political commu-
nity. No doubt at all. But it is also insufficient if a perspective from social and 
political movements is adopted. Even walling the states, as Brown indicates, is a 
symptom of the eroding sovereignty. The issue is rather to identify the existing 
struggles at different scales and to see how they contribute to forging such a po-
litical community.  
Coming back to the issue of popular sovereignty, it raises the question wheth-
er political communities are restricted to nation-state. It is true that it is difficult 
to think of an articulation of the people beyond nation-state territory. If so, it 
should lead to the use of the people (as particular) and humanity (as universal). 
However, the dichotomy between Empire and counter-Empire can be the 
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ground to imagine a kind of transnational populism. Antal Attila (2019), com-
bining his reading of Chantal Mouffe with Hardt and Negri, suggests to under-
stand “multitude” as empty signifier to articulate global struggles against the global 
elites. This idea is, of course, contrary to Hardt and Negri’s immanent concep-
tion of multitude which is besides de-embedded from the sphere of social pro-
duction and reproduction. However, it introduces a new perspective on how 
multitude can be articulated to gather social demands (and rights) at the global 
level.  
4. Towards Complex Sovereignty 
The shift from nation-state to global sovereignty, claimed by Hardt and Negri, is 
problematic in several aspects: Global sovereignty is still ongoing and difficult to 
detach from nation-state sovereignty (and their tensions and frictions); the rede-
finition of sovereignty should not lead to getting rid of it as the main alternative 
(through exodus or non-sovereignty); forms of sovereignty like popular sove-
reignty refer to the two sides of sovereignty and not only to territorialized sove-
reignty; and there is a need for thinking of existing political communities, in-
cluding the territorialized ones, to overcome the limitations of the multitude. 
Therefore, I propose a reformulation of the conceptualization of what I call here 
“complex sovereignty” which: 1) cannot be reduced to nation-state vs. global; 2) 
is not referable only to forms of domination but also of resistance, and 3) con-
ceptually is based on the development of three notions: scales, interdependence 
and intersectionality. The idea is to recover and emphasize the relevance of the 
demos or political community in the process of redefining sovereignty. David 
Chandler (2009b: p. 544) expresses his concern that the globalization of politics 
reflects the abstraction and idealization of political engagement, increasingly less 
socially grounded: “when we engage ‘globally’ we engage with less social connec-
tion, with less social mediation, making our actions less strategic or instrumen-
tal, less clearly goal-orientated”. My intention is to avoid abstraction and recover 
such an engagement by highlighting, among others, the importance of space (its 
uses, appropriations and connections) to reshape sovereignty. 
4.1. Multi-Scalar Sovereignty 
Hardt and Negri (2019: p. 73) explain that Empire is not a global state with a 
unified centralized structure of rule, and a homogeneous and unified political 
subject cannot be expected (something like “the global people”). Thus, globaliza-
tion is both “processes of homogenization and heterogenization. Rather than 
creating one smooth space, the emergence of Empire involves the proliferation 
of borders and hierarchies at every geographical scale, from the space of the sin-
gle metropolis to that of the great continents”. The combination of processes of 
homogenization and heterogenization at every geographical scale is determinant, 
in my view, of a complex approach to sovereignty through the incorporation of 
scale. Hardt and Negri are right to single out these processes on the side of do-
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mination, but resistance can also be added (and both in relation to sovereignty 
as two-sided). The proliferation of borders and hierarchies stresses the spatial 
read of Empire. Borders are mainly deployed to nation-states (even as proof of 
their eroding sovereignty) but to other spaces too. The challenge is how to act 
within and against these spaces when the option suggested by Hardt and Negri 
(organizing the existing forms of production and reproduction) works quite li-
mited. 
Sovereignty is not vanishing but moving through scales to other spaces.  
The terrain of nation-state is too easily disregarded by Hardt and Negri, al-
though they have a point when stressing the insufficiency of returning to the state 
as the only option. Global capitalism and global governance raise many ques-
tions (from the transformation of the model of production to the internationali-
zation of climate policies and their resistance) that barely can be satisfied from 
the perspective of nation-state. I consider that the starting point of Empire is 
quite valid: The form of Empire (neoliberal globalization, global governance) 
should be contested by the counter-Empire. However, the incarnation of that re-
sistance by multitude presents two problems: The tendency towards abstraction 
(multitude existing at the global level) and the normative consideration of what 
counter-Empire is or what it is not (basically, everything that is not multitude 
does not count as counter-Empire). If Empire manifests itself at every geograph-
ical scale, the counter-Empire would do the same and in various forms, not li-
mited to the form of multitude. The social and political struggles are, besides, 
struggles for sovereignty, but not every struggle is for global sovereignty. The 
conceptions of sovereignty (and of the political communities) at stake change 
through scales. Scales in themselves do not have democratic content (the local is 
not more democratic than the national, in principle). They are, as Mark Purcell 
(2006: p. 1921) recalls, “socially constructed strategies to achieve particular ends”. 
The idea of multi-scalar sovereignty consists of exploring the struggles for sove-
reignty at different scales and their capacity (or not) of interconnecting scales.  
The articulation of the 99% vs. the 1% is a clear example of how socio-spatialized 
struggles like the Occupy Wall Street movement at the urban scale is capable of 
scaling-up and envisioning a global antagonism between “ordinary people” and 
the elite. This is not just an abstraction, since the universalizing character of “the 
people” here is rooted in local struggles. Even a dramatic case like the Greek 
bailout referendum in 2015 makes different types of sovereignty visible: from 
popular sovereignty (manifested through the referendum) and state sovereignty 
(represented by the Greek government) to the international intervention by the 
European Union and the articulation of the national and transnational progres-
sive movements supporting the Oxi. It is difficult not to consider that these 
movements are activating notions of popular sovereignty at different scales and 
questioning the global capital and governance as well as national and local scales 
of command. That is the case of the Refugees Welcome solidarity movement 
when movements enhance practices of local solidarity and scale-up their de-
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mands at the national and European scales. The formation of municipal net-
works of solidarity within Europe proved how solidarity can become part of in-
stitutions and combining different scales. It should be noted that in all these cas-
es, the identification of the enemy (Empire, the elite) is not sufficient, but or-
ganization in a more or less formal way (from movements to institution) is ne-
cessary.  
The idea of “shared sovereignty” shows that sovereignty, far from being gone, 
is in process of redefinition. Although it is used (Krasner, 2004) to explain the 
involvement of international actors in some domestic issue (with the expectation 
that international agreements improve domestic sovereignty), Xavier Domènech 
(2017) acknowledges the insufficiency of state sovereignty in times of globaliza-
tion but affirms that sovereignty must be shared by nation-states and interna-
tional actors as well regional and municipal authorities and actors. “Sharing so-
vereignty” from the perspective of political and social actors is, actually, a good 
way of approaching sovereignty at multiple scales and as a combination of polit-
ical and social forces (not to forget that sovereignty is a relationship). The notion 
of interdependence can grasp the conceptualization of sovereignty as mul-
ti-scalar and conflictual relationship.  
4.2. Interdependence 
The multitude must constitute a new Prince as a democratic structure, according 
to Hardt and Negri. They are not interested in substituting one ruler for another 
if the structures of government remain the same. However, Assembly reflects a 
close approach to the ongoing political and social struggles, in a similar way to 
Declaration (2012) which drew on the cycle of social protest from 2011. This ex-
plains that Hardt and Negri (2017) consider three forms of governance, based on 
three strategies: exodus, antagonistic reformism and taking power. Exodus con-
sists of prefigurative politics, antagonistic reformism is engaging with existing 
institutions and transforming them from within, and taking power is the hege-
monic operation of transforming the whole society. The novelty of this typology 
is that Hardt and Negri see them as complementary rather than divergent. This 
can be surprising since strategies of autonomy (exodus) and hegemony coexist 
and the differentiation between immanence and transcendence is not deployed 
to prioritize one strategy over the other. The strategies of antagonistic reformism 
and hegemony bring Hardt and Negri’s positions closer to those of, for instance, 
Laclau and Mouffe. The complementary relation between state and stateless 
spaces and actors is important to introduce the first notion of interdependence. 
Focusing on the case of antagonistic reformism (which is opposed to cooperative 
reformism) shows that it is reformist both within and against the state and it 
must have alliances within projects outside the state (e.g. political parties and so-
cial movements). Interdependence contains the duality of sovereignty, expressed 
by parties, within the dynamics of existing institutions, and their openness to so-
cial movements and civil society in general. The cases of movement-parties such 
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as Podemos in Spain or Syriza in Greece show that tension accentuated when 
they are in government. The same principle can be applied to new municipalism. 
Despite the proximity attributed to local politics, the tensions within the elector-
al coalitions (including movements, activists and parties), the institutional logic 
and the relationship with other parties show the complexities of acting within 
and against. 
Together with this notion connecting, so to say, the institutional and social (or 
constituted and popular sovereignty), interdependence is also valuable in refer-
ring to communities and issues beyond the state and the way in which states in-
teract with social movements and other transnational actors. Daniel Innerarity 
(2012) explains that interdependency generates a shift from sovereignty as con-
trol to sovereignty as responsibility, since the state has to be responsible for 
global issues such as climate change or human rights. Antonio Negri and Cocco 
(2006) reflect on interdependence as a matter of sovereignty as two-sided and of 
global sovereignty and offer a convincing approach to interdependence based on 
the Latin American experience. Governing interdependence implies the open-
ness of hybrid forms of governance between political parties and social move-
ments and combining a national and international scope of governance. The lat-
ter is interesting if the regional processes of cooperation in Latin America in the 
decade of the 00s are considered. Besides ruling nationally, there was a sense of 
governing interdependence through strengthening regional politics and creating 
new organizations (UNASUR, ALBA, CELAC). The strong ideological content 
of some of these organizations and the fear of transcending nation-state sove-
reignty revealed some of the weaknesses of the regional process. In any case, it is 
an example of multi-scalar sovereignty (national and regional) from the gov-
ernments’ perspective, but also from the movements that use national institu-
tions, albeit addressing global issues. Since there is no constitutional and institu-
tional framework to address global issues, the political community claims for 
their demands with different strategies and at different scales.  
4.3. Intersectional Political Community 
Thinking of sovereignty as multi-scalar and the dual meaning of interdepen-
dence is helpful to understand the recent changes of sovereignty. This frame-
work allows us to approach sovereignty from the perspective of the ruled and 
not only of the ruler. The issue of political community is quite complicated. As 
shown, the post-territorial political community (multitude) presents several de-
ficiencies. On the other hand, the people, as political community, fits better with 
the attribution of rights and duties, an existing institutional and legal framework 
and forms of mediation. The problem is that the people face difficulties as cate-
gory applicable to global dynamics. Although it is possible to talk about people 
at different scales, the composition of the political community changes. It is not 
the same to receive undocumented migrants who express a sense of (urban) citi-
zenship and become part of the local political community, on the one hand, and 
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their acceptance within the nation-state, at least from the view of the sovereign 
power, on the other. Attached to popular sovereignty, the people can expand the 
representation, the connection between parties and movements, participation, 
but what is questionable is how inclusive a category like “the people” is to in-
clude the existing plurality of struggles. Hardt and Negri are quite clear that 
people entail a unified political subject subjugated to the one who commands. I 
consider that this remark must be taken seriously. Although my understanding 
of political community is territorialized (not exclusively anchored in nation-state 
but through scales) instead of deterritorial (avoiding the risks of abstraction) like 
multitude, its multiplicity must be assured. Therefore, political community must 
be intersectional. 
The idea of adding intersectionality appears in the later work of Hardt and 
Negri in order to correct the predominance of economic dominance in their 
concept of multitude in detriment of other types of domination. In order to be-
come intersectional, Hardt and Negri (2019: p. 87) propose the formula C-M-C’. 
The shift from class to multitude is due to the expansion of capitalism (and labor 
and the production of value) from the factory to the whole society. The need to 
move from multitude to class prime originates in adding other struggles not only 
based on capital struggles. The return to class (as class prime) is one “from a 
unified political conception based on a single axis of domination, that deter-
mined by capital, to a multiplicity, which also engages patriarchy, white supre-
macy and other axes”. The new version of class is not merely socio-economic: It 
includes different relations of domination and implies that a sort of internal ar-
ticulation is necessary. The way in which these struggles are articulated main-
taining their specificities is quite confusing due to the effort to preserve their 
immanence. The same problem was previously identified with respect to the 
mediation of post-territorial political communities. 
A similar formula could be applied to other territorial political communities 
as “the people” in order to obtain an intersectional political community that re-
sponds to diverse cross-cutting structural asymmetries. Thus, migrant, feminist, 
LGBT+ struggles could be part of an inclusionary notion of “the people”. The 
case of the German Seebrücke (Sea Bridge) movement is a good example of how 
a movement demands the European governments to resume rescue missions in 
the Mediterranean and to allow refugees the right to asylum and, at the same 
time, calls on municipal authorities to declare themselves a “safe harbor” (Schwiertz 
& Keß, 2019). Interdependence works here between movements and institutions 
and at the connection of local, national and international scales. The resulting 
intersectional political community, like the people, does not need to be grounded 
in humanitarian values but can reflect the multiplicity of forms of dominations 
such as race and class. One of the activists, Alina Lyapina (2019), emphasizes the 
commonalities despite multiple discriminations and enhances a community to 
claim for equal rights: “The people you call foreigners face the same daily prob-
lems you face. What unites you is the common struggle against those injustices 
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you are both experiencing. We need to address the structural problems in the 
current political and economic set-up. A good life for everyone is possible no 
matter what the racist far right or those who actually cause those injustices tell 
you”. 
In all, intersectional political community articulates multiple discriminations 
and highlights the interdependence between movement and institutions while 
connecting and reframing rights and struggles which are (re)territorialized at 
different scales. It is possible to overcome then the limitations of the post-territorial 
political community and reflect the notion of “complex sovereignty” when the 
articulation scales and interdependence are constituting a new form of sove-
reignty, no longer reduced to nation-states or disappeared in the non-spaces of 
globalization.  
5. Conclusion 
The intellectual project initiated by Hardt and Negri twenty years ago offers an 
original and challenging way of conceiving sovereignty from its state to its global 
form. One of their most stimulating contributions is to think about the conse-
quences of this emergent form of sovereignty, not least in relation to the political 
subject of resistance. However, at some point Hardt and Negri seem to reject the 
notion of sovereignty rather than redefining it. I have identified some of the 
problems related to Imperial sovereignty and the overcoming of state sove-
reignty proposed by Hardt and Negri and to the concept of multitude as the 
post-territorial political community of resistance against Empire. Through re-
vising and reframing some of Hardt and Negri’s contributions, I have elaborated 
an alternative framework to account for complex sovereignty, based on two 
ideas: The new form of sovereignty is rearticulating the connection between scales 
(global, national, local), rather than replacing the nation-state with the global, 
and sovereignty is dual, meaning the conflictual coexistence between those who 
command and those who are ruled. This dynamic conceptualization of complex 
sovereignty relies on three elements: multi-scalar sovereignty, interdependence 
and intersectional political community.  
• Multi-scalar sovereignty: Rather than disappeared from nation-state, sove-
reignty has moved to different scales from global to national and local scales. 
None of these scales are autonomous (there is no such thing as full sove-
reignty at one sole scale) but rather interconnected. However, the connection 
between scales is not automatic so the challenge, especially from the perspec-
tive of resistance, is how to interconnect them and put every scale into value. 
It means that the local space is an important space to forge social and politi-
cal alternatives as forms of popular sovereignty; the nation-state is still de-
terminant to promote political change; and the global scale should be ad-
dressed to respond to the economic, political, environmental and social is-
sues which go beyond the framework of nation-states.  
• Interdependence: It should be consequently insufficient to think of nation-states 
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as independent units of decision making within the global context as well as 
to consider governments as the only ones to make those decisions within the 
nation-states. This situation creates two spaces for interdependence: one be-
tween governments and civil society and another one between different na-
tion-states or regions. The former requires complementing forms of repre-
sentative politics with others of deliberation and participation whilst the lat-
ter implies increasing regional cooperation and integration by acknowledging 
their potential to address a common and globalized agenda. Both dimensions 
of interdependence entail different types of tensions: on the one hand, be-
tween political parties (or institutions) and social movements, and on the 
other, between national sovereignty and other forms of shared sovereignty.   
• Intersectional political community: When thinking of political community, 
territorialized political communities such as “the people” have been criticized 
for reducing the plurality of society and paving the way for the appropriation 
of the “collective will” by a political leader. Multitude, as post-territorial po-
litical community, highlights the multiplicity of social struggles but lacks a 
clear way of organizing politically a community with its respective rights and 
duties. It is necessary to move beyond the opposition between unity and 
multiplicity and between territoriality and non-territoriality, and search for 
an intersectional political community which includes the plurality of identi-
ties and subjectivities and is capable of giving rights and recognitions to their 
members at different scales.  
Thus, the risk of abstraction is corrected through the inclusion of scales but 
also the risk of limiting sovereignty to the nation-state. Interdependence is a 
concept applied to the relationship between movements and parties (or civil so-
ciety and institutions) and the relationship between states, social movements and 
transnational actors at the international scales. Finally, considering the political 
community as intersectional adds plurality to the political subject and better 
grasps the diversity of responses to the multiplicity of dominances but within the 
articulation of a common political subject. Thus, I believe that this framework 
contributes to deepening the discussion of sovereignty and its challenges in 
times of globalization and enriches the debate that Hardt and Negri initiated 
with Empire and, fortunately, have maintained open since then.  
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